(Presentation
at the United Service Institution,
New Delhi,
National Security Seminar
on November 9- 10, 2004).
The
USI Security Seminar 2004 on “India and its
South Asian Neighbours other than Pakistan” limits
the discussion to the countries situated primarily
to the East and South of India.
Although it excludes Pakistan the fact remains that Pakistan’s
mischief-making potential remains strong enough in all
these countries – actually and potentially -to
make the standalone analyses deficient if this influence
is not taken into account.
Hence it would be prudent to commence with a brief analysis
of the intractable situation on the Western front where
for full
50 years and more India has been led by the nose by Pakistan,
in a manner of speaking, both internally and externally.
India’s
policy has almost invariably been reactive. No doubt
Bangladesh was an outstanding success. However, the
military gains
were fast dissipated in Pakistan as well as in Bangladesh
post-1971.
Irrespective of the decline of Pakistan itself on the
global arena in recent years, it is undeniable that
Pakistan has
succeeded brilliantly in the following domains:
-
Undermined India’s
efforts at securing a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
- Keeping the Kashmir
question alive in global forums.
-
In concert with China limiting India’s access to
Central Asia.
- Reducing the
colossus called India into a whimpering giant by forcing
it to plead
before the world community to save it
from cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan.
- Putting India
on the defensive on several counts.
- Forcing India
to expend enormous outlays to counter the threat of low
intensity conflict generated by Pakistan or sponsored
by Pakistan.
- Creating adverse
situations on the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bangladesh borders.
- In concert with
Saudi Arabia contributing to the enormous proliferation
of madrasas in India and other parts
of subcontinent, notably Bangladesh and the Indo-Nepal
border.
- Sustaining militant
groups in the North East in spite of the crushing military
defeat in East Bengal in 1971.
- Multiplication
of jehadi cells in many parts of India and the subcontinent.
- Circulation of
large amounts of fake currency in the country.
- In concert with
its sympathizers in Bangladesh forcing an exodus of Hindus
from that country.
- Pushing in hostile
elements for permanent residence in India for carrying
out anti-Indian activities at opportune moments.
- Domination of
the underworld in Mumbai and other areas on the West Coast
through its proxies based in Mumbai.
- Infiltration
of the Mumbai film industry.
-
Furthering political – criminal nexus in many of
the Western states notably, Maharastra
and Gujarat.
-
Militancy in J&K.
- Innumerable acts
of subversion, sabotage and terrorism.
- Subversion of
the Muslim psyche and setting up of pan-Islamic movements
with anti-India
overtones.
When
looked at dispassionately
the implications
of the tabulations
made
above should
have a sobering
effect. It
is inconceivable
that a country
the
size
of India
with resources that
far outmatch
its adversary,
Pakistan
should have
allowed this state of
affairs
to continue
for decades on end.
This is in
spite of
having got
the better
of Pakistan
in four
wars against
the country.
Had
an adverse
situation developed for
India in
any of the
conflicts
the consequences
for India
would have been
far too grim
to
even think
about. Therefore,
the question
to be addressed
is
whether
India is
intrinsically weak or
whether it
has been artificially
weakened
through wrong
policies,
wrong military priorities
and
an
inability
to grasp the
essentials
of the threat that
it
faces
from Pakistan
and the
manner in
which it should be
handled.
To
overcome the weaknesses
that
have been
allowed to come into
India’s strategic planning and thinking and the response
patterns that have resulted from the faulty premises, there is
a need to apply a tabula rasa approach in an attempt to change
the locus as well as the focus of the debate. In the process
it is hoped that pathways might evolve that could lead to a more
efficacious response to the threats emanating in India’s
neighbourhood. While the emphasis will remain on the countries
under discussion in the Seminar – the focus of the study – it
will be shown that some of the anomalies that had crept into
the thinking had resulted from, inter alia, looking at these
countries in ‘isolation’,
even after
it had
become
abundantly
clear to
the defence
planners
of India
that China,
USA and
the Western
countries
have not
taken a
hands off
approach
as regards
the subcontinent.
For
India to emerge
as an
important
player
on the
global
scene,
it has
to be
able to tackle
the radical
Islamists
threat
from
Pakistan,
which
has increasingly
been
extended
to
the Eastern
sector
and even
within
India
under
the nose
of India’s
intelligence agencies. Therefore, unless India has a viable capacity
for breaking the impasse that has developed on the subject of
cross border terrorism and cross border influx of illegal immigrants
it would not be in a position to prevent the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism as well as the Maoist-Naxalite threat on the subcontinent.
It becomes one of the prime concerns of the present seminar to
undertake an analysis of the non-war pathways to arrive at a
comfort level that successfully relegates the cross border potential
of Pakistan and Bangladesh through the Eastern corridors now
in the ascendant to more manageable levels. Nepal presents a
problem for India that has a dimension at variance with the threat
from Bangladesh. For the time being the Sri Lanka threat has
entered a dormant phase as far as India’s
security
is concerned.
The
Government of
India has come
in
for
considerable criticism,
both
from
outside
the
country and within
at
its
handling of its
neighbours
over
the
years.
What
many
people
find
inexplicable
is
that a country
the
size of India
should
continue
to
appeal to other
countries
to
restrain Pakistan
and
now
even Bangladesh
from
abetting
cross-border
insurgent
groups.
Since
intrinsically
these
countries
can
be
no match
for
India
seeing
the
relative
strengths
of
all concerned the
fault for India’s supposed
helplessness
in dealing effectively with them must lie in wrong prioritization
of force structuring and weapons acquisitions,
as
also the fixation on an unproductive one-track defence strategy,
which
ignored several other options available to the country
to
right the situation.
The
paper goes
into
areas
that
have
been
considered
taboo
to
date
on
account
of
denominational
and
other
sensitivities.
The
armed
forces
are
a
professional organization.
It
is
incumbent
upon
professional
forces
everywhere
in
the
world
to
examine
every
aspect
of
national
security
with
clinical
detachment.
For
example,
when
the
most
sacred
place of
Islam
i.e.
Mecca
itself
was
threatened
by
revolutionaries
some
years
ago,
the
Saudi
forces
had
no
hesitation
in
storming
the
holiest
Citadel
of
Islam
to
restore
order.
Numerous
other
instances
can
be
cited
from
Egypt
and
elsewhere
in
the
world.
Nations
mindful
of
their
security
and
especially
armed
forces
are
meant
to
act
decisively,
when
a
clear threat
emerges.
It
is
only
in
India
that
problems
are
allowed
to
fester
due
to
endless
agonizing.
This
has
become
a
peculiar Indian
trait.
Unfortunately,
it
may
have
entered
into
the
armed
forces
mindset
as
well.
Whatever
be
the
case,
this
paper
takes
the
approach
that national
security
and,
by
extension,
national
survival
supercedes
all
other
considerations,
be
they
religious
or
of
any
other
kind.
There
is no
doubt that
the threat
to Indian
security today
is greatest
from global
terrorism, linked
to Islamic
fundamentalism. A
parallel threat
developing due
to the regrouping
of Naxalite-Maoist
forces is
not the
focus of
the paper
on account
of the
space and
time constraints.
It is
amenable to
instigation, support
or training from
both Pakistan
and Bangladesh,
acting in
concert. These
kinds of
threats are
all-pervasive and
can surface
from within
the country
or from
the West
or the
East, as
is being
witnessed with
increasing frequency
via Bangladesh
and even
Nepal, putting
the entire
Northeast in
danger. It
is not
so much
the potency
of the
threat as
it exists
today, but
its alarming
potential due
to the
inability of
the governments
of India
to take
decisive and
what is
more timely
action.
By
the same
token, while
adversaries use
the interim
between wars
to strengthen
themselves for
another round or to achieve
their
long-term
objectives (as
in the case of China,
USA and
Pakistan), in
India complacency sets in very fast,
even in
the armed
forces, leading
to vulnerabilities
that had
not existed earlier
- after the successful
conclusion of
the last
round. This
pitfall too
needs to
be avoided
by the
Indian armed
forces in
future.
In
any permanent
de-escalation with Pakistan
it
will have
to be
ensured that cross
border terrorism
is
ended not
only into
J&K, from other sectors as
well - in the Northeast, including Bangladesh and Nepal. Otherwise, while Pakistan
may reluctantly concede to ending cross border infiltration into J&K,
it might redouble
the effort
in other sectors.
On
account of the geographical
contiguity
with Bangladesh
and presence
of 16 million
or so
illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants
in
the border-states
the
rise
of Islamic
terrorism
in the eastern
neighbourhood
poses
a serious
threat to
India’s
long-term
national security and territorial integrity. The threat is
compounded by the continuing insurgency in the northeast
under the aegis of the ISI and
the DGFI.
Significantly, ULFA and MULTA have already joined the Islamic
Manch, an umbrella organization of the Islamic terrorist
outfits floated in May 2002,
to coordinate
inter-organizational activities geared to establishing a
transnational Islamic state in the region with Bangladesh
at its core. This is in keeping with
the gradual
shift from the West (Pakistan) to the East (Bangladesh and
the northeast) of the asymmetrical warfare capability being
built up against India as a long-term,
almost never-ending
quest for the internal erosion of India. The shift besides
complementing
the Islamic jihad effort from Pakistan has been necessitated
by the greater intrusiveness of the US and Western scrutiny
and reach in Pakistan,
an intrusiveness
that is likely to deepen with each passing year. Taking the
definition
outlined by other writers ‘asymmetric threat’ is
defined as a threat that can cause harm in bigger magnitude
than its size.
Asymmetric
threat
is also defined as a threat that does not follow the known
patterns
of warfare
including surprise attacks, as well as warfare with weapons
used in an
unconventional
manner. It must also be linked to the disproportionality
factor discussed in the book Dealing with Global Terrorism:
The Way Forward. Unless
this asymmetric
or disproportionality factor is tackled without resorting
to conventional
war, both internally and externally in the shape of cross
border
terrorism,
India might not be able to get the upper hand. While the
US might find it difficult to deal with the disproportionality
factor, the degree
of difficulty
in the case of India can be considerably reduced.
Hence,
peace can only
come
in after comprehensive
dismantling
of assets
in
all
sectors.
By the
same token,
the long-term
prognostication
of any
understanding
with
Pakistan and Bangladesh
and
the
peace
measures that follow
will
generally always
turn
out to India’s disadvantage because these countries
will retain the ability to reactivate dormant cells and restart
anti-India activities
at
any time
as long as the military-mullah combine retains power in them
in any form. Therefore, India cannot afford to lower its
guard. If anything,
it will
have
to redouble its intelligence and counter intelligence efforts;
more so, if the peace process moves forward significantly.
Whatever
be
the outcome
of
the talks
between
India
and
its neighbours
and
whatever be the
concessions
made
by
India
to
defuse tensions
with
these
countries,
either
of
their own accord
or
due to external
pressures,
the
aspects
outlined
in
the
ensuing paragraphs
will
invariably
work
to
India’s disadvantage for a long
time to come. Firstly, the Muslim community, almost en masse, will be opposed
to some fundamental shifts that have taken place in India’s
foreign
policy.
These
relate
to
a better
relationship
between
USA
and
India
and
Israel
and
India.
In
both
cases,
the
Muslim
community
is
most
likely
to
frown
upon
the
new
direction
taken
by
the
Government
of
India,
presently
or
by
any
successor
government.
It
stems
from
a visceral
anti-Israel
sentiment
amongst
Muslims
and
the
pan-Islamic
hatred
toward
USA
that
has
become
embedded
in
Muslim
communities
in
almost
all
countries
having
sizeable
Muslim
populations.
In
India,
the
problem
is
exacerbated
by
the
large
size
of
the
Muslim
population
and
its
vulnerability
to
propaganda
coming
from
across
the
border.
Hence,
Indian
leaders
and
the
Government
of
India
have
to
reconcile
themselves
to
this
sentiment,
which
goes
against
the
foreign
policies
of
the
government,
based
on
religion
and
for
no
other
reason
or
from
any
anti-nationalism.
To
that
extent,
this
identifying
with
the
pan-Islamic
sentiment
at
the
cost
of
the
national
interest
is
something
that
has
to be
lived
with
and
taken
into
account
by
all
governments
and
its
instruments
for
the
foreseeable
future.
Secondly,
while
the
military
regime
in
Pakistan
and
the
ruling
dispensation
in
Bangladesh
may
actually
succeed
in
dismantling
the
jehadi
camps
used
for
training
cross
border
infiltrators,
it
is
not
likely
to
ever
succeed
in
dismantling
the
madrasas
run
by
the
radical
groups
that
advocate
jihad
and
the
killing
of
Hindus or
non-believers
by
devout
Muslims
as
a
matter
of
faith.
Actually,
it
is
the
hatred
imbibed
into
the
young
entrants
into
the
madrasas
that
allows
these
tanzeems
to
keep
a
stranglehold
on
their
flock.
Modernize
the
madrasas
and
let
fresh
thoughts
flow
in
and
one
will
witness
a
sea change
in
the
behaviour
of
the
students.
However,
the
radical
Islamists
are
not
going
to
let
it
happen
and
no
government
is
going
to
enter
into
a
major confrontation
with
these
groups
on
this
count.
Regardless
of
the
peace
overtures
and
other
confidence
building
measures,
the
products
of
these
madrasas
and
the
firebrand
leaders that
control
them
will
always
be
in
a
position to
reestablish
the
training
camps
for
suicide
missions
across
the
border.
Thirdly,
as long
as America
remains bent
upon extending
its influence
in the
Middle East,
Central Asia,
Pakistan and
Afghanistan it
is axiomatic
that anti-modern
Islam, in
whatever form,
will flourish,
especially on
the subcontinent.
Because of
the pan-Islamic
sentiment in
this regard ‘a few’ Muslim groups
in India from time to time will either become amenable
to join radical groups and indulge in anti-national activities
or push their followers into anti-modernity.
In the latter case, even if they do not directly indulge
in anti-national activities per se, they help in creating
the tinder box that can be set aflame
by firebrands at some future date when the sentiment of
the Muslim youth is exploited due
to the policies of the governments of India being followed
in the national interest
that can be made to look as being anti-Muslim even if they
are not so.
These
are some
of the
aspects that
will continue
to hamstring
India’s growth
as a regional power regardless of the progress made on the economic or other
fronts and irrespective of the concessions that India may make to Pakistan and
Bangladesh to lessen tensions in J&K
as well as between the two
countries as part of the larger
measures to harmonise relationships.
That being the
case, it would be foolhardy
in the extreme for the Government
of India or its main
security instruments to lower
their guard in the wake of
improved relations. Pakistan
and Bangladesh will always
retain the option to raise
the ante and
start fermenting trouble whenever
they choose to do so. India
has no such retaliatory mechanism
other than going to war with
these countries. To overcome
this perpetual
menace the following steps
will have to be taken:
- First and foremost,
the Government of India and its instruments responsible for
the security of the country have to realize that Pakistan
and Bangladesh
will always be in a position to create mischief for India,
either directly or
as proxy for outside powers, unless they are sufficiently
weakened so that they are unable
to indulge in anti-Indian activities in the future. Otherwise
India will continue
to suffer as it has for the last 50 years in spite of being
the stronger power, militarily as well as economically.
- The internal
security instruments have to be beefed up so that they
are able
to ferret out and destroy all sleeper cells and organizations
infiltrated
by hostile agencies. There can be no let up in this activity,
regardless of
the attitude of the states. The training and sophistication
of paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies to unearth
and deal with such threats has to be
increased manifold.
-
The demographic profile, especially in the border-states,
has to be monitored far more professionally. In border
areas any attempts made by fundamentalists,
be they Pakistani or Bangladeshi agents or Indian nationals
to bolster anti-modernity and push the women behind the ‘purdah’ and
not let them attend
state schools has to be ruthlessly
dealt with.
Special
efforts should
be made,
through central
agencies deployed
on the
border if
necessary, to
open schools
for backward
populations amenable
to the
propaganda of
the fundamentalists,
whether it
originates from
across the
border or
within the
country.
It
is high
time that
people entrusted
with India’s security understood
that until the Pakistan and Bangladeshi jehadis are comprehensively disabled
there cannot be any peace between India and these countries, even if satisfactory
peace accords take place. It is because of the failure of India’s
political
leadership
and defence
establishment
to grasp this
fact that
the
potential
for mischief
will always
be retained
by those inimical
to India.
This
potential
for
serious mischief
remains one-sided.
It obtains
only in
Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
India
has a
different set
of problems.
What must
be understood
is that
whether in
peace or
in war
the militants
will keep
planning to undermine India. This exercise
will be
carried out
by them
ad infinitum.
Hence, India
too has
to single-mindedly
plan for
the destruction
of these
elements by
means other
than conventional
war. So
far only
lip service
has been
paid to
other avenues available for
creating the conditions
for
the destruction
of such
elements.
One or two examples of the prevailing one-sidedness will suffice.
On the Pakistan and Bangladesh
side the fundamentalists can always block the dissemination
of Indian publications and
films in provinces or sectors where they hold sway, as they
have been doing earlier. Whereas, on the Indian side they
will freely use the opportunity available to subvert the
psyche of the Muslim population in India through propaganda,
direct access, media, and through the spread of madrasas.
(The Indian Constitution, judiciary and media, while these
are strengths of Indian democracy, which India should rightly
cherish and be proud of, works to India’s disadvantage
and detriment in as far as it relates to these threats from
across). For example, it has to be realized that under General
Musharraf the jehadi organizations in Pakistan are extending
their grassroots network much faster than even Pervez Musharraf
or the Americans realize.
While mainstream political
parties have been circumscribed the militant organizations
are setting up madrasas with each
passing month. They are also organizing grassroots charitable
activities for the poorer sections of Pakistan’s society,
neglected by the state. Their collection boxes are swelling
from massive, small size donations from the ordinary public.
They are investing this money well. In the next five to ten
years they will mount a credible challenge to the supremacy
in the marketplace of the Pakistan-army’s Fauji Foundation.
Something similar could be taking place in Bangladesh.
Deterrence and containment
of the terrorist threat can never be the long-term strategy
of any nation facing a potent terrorist
threat. It has to be the destruction of the heart and mind
of the organization or entity sponsoring it. Fly swatting should
ideally succeed and not precede the former. For an inordinately
long period, on account of an inability to come to grips with
the essence of the problem, the Indian polity as well as its
security apparatus has been unable to tackle the problem effectively.
The response has to change. Each nation has to evolve its own
alternatives to the US method of dealing with terrorist threats – i.e.
pre-emptive destruction or massive retaliation.
After ‘major’ blows
to Al Qaeda and other forms of Islamists, the USA is reasonably
content to channelise the
residual energy of the Islamists/jehadis to Russia, Asia and
Africa; i.e. Chechnya, Kashmir and wherever else, provided
that Western countries remain insulated to a reasonable degree.
For the same reason the Western world, in spite of knowing
the difficulties and having appreciated first hand ethnic incompatibilities
with foreign populations within, nevertheless, continue to
castigate India on that score. It suits them, diverts attention
and shifts the focus away from them. India, therefore, remains
important to them for this reason as well.
Beefing up India’s internal
security is the surest way of ensuring the degradation of
hostile capabilities against
India. Needless to say, it leaves much to be desired. A democracy
with the polity like the one in India will always leave wide
gaps in national security, literally and metaphorically, for
an enemy to exploit, especially an enemy who can invariably
target pan-Islamic sympathies or resentments that have built
up in the minority community for various other reasons. The
matter is compounded due to the fact that security being a
state subject with states responsible for not only dealing
with security matters, but also for prosecution, the situation
is far from satisfactory.
Additionally, a major flaw that has remained in the Constitution
in as far as it relates to internal security; one which has
not been remedied in spite of various constitutional amendments
in other fields over the last 50 years is the lack of the
definition of a federal crime or a federal prosecution agency
covering
the whole country. Hardly any other country has such infirmities,
which can be exploited by interests inimical to the country.
Notwithstanding the above the Indian army must acquaint itself
with security enhancement measures being taken by several entities
within their respective countries and globally. For example,
security guards monitoring close circuit television round the
clock may soon become reality for Indian companies supplying
high tech security devices. Surveillance cameras could become
ubiquitous in Indian factories, because of a US law, which
requires exporters to take measures to reduce the threat of
terrorist attacks. Leading American retailers and apparel brands
such as Wal-Mart, JC Penney and Phillips Van Heusen are in
the process of implementing a plan to bring their dedicated
suppliers in India under a stringent new law called the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The move, the
latest in the series of measures initiated by the US government
in the aftermath of 9/11, is aimed at guarding commercial shipments
to the US against terrorist attacks. The measures under implementation
include installation of closed-circuit televisions with a view
of critical locations including entrances. Every factory, the
US buyers are insisting, should have an eight-foot fence or
wall.
The objective of the programme
is clearly spelt out in a communication on C-TPAT (including
a detailed questionnaire on the security
aspects) that Wal-Mart—the world’s largest company
with revenues of $246.5 billion—has recently sent to
its Indian suppliers. The communication states: “Wal-Mart’s
policy is that all suppliers establish procedures to guard
against introduction of non-manifested cargo into outbound
shipments. Such items would include drugs, biological agents,
weapons, radio-active material, illegal aliens and other contrabands.” Post-9/11,
US authorities have increased security manifold, Shipping lines
are now required to inform US customs authorities in advance
of the details of containers. It is believed that shipping
companies will also be brought under the ambit of C-TPAT.
The American majors are now
gathering data on the security aspects of their suppliers’ plants
in India. Some of them are even holding interactive sessions
with suppliers on
the benefits of joining C-TPAT. Meetings were recently held
in Mumbai and Bangalore where most apparel suppliers are located.
According to apparel industry sources, any supplier who forms
part of the partnership agreement will be considered a low-risk
importer, whose shipments will be subject to fewer security
examinations by US customs. These importers will also be exempt
from focused assessment audits. According to industry sources,
some American non-government organizations (NGO) will be given
the powers to check whether Indian suppliers are C-TPAT clear
or not.
Looking ahead the time may have come, in the face of increasingly
sophisticated security threats of a type not faced to date
by the Indian army, to incorporate high-tech measures along
similar lines, for reasons that do not require to be spelled
out. In fact, indigenous satellite technology and existing
circuits allow for the central monitoring, as a backup measure
of several installations and areas around the country. A scheme
along these lines can be worked out separately.
THE
DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMIC
According to a former US Secretary
of State, demography plays an important role on account of
the fast multiplying populations.
The submissive role forced on women led to the population explosion.
He went on to say: “generations of young people have
grown up in these societies with a surplus of time on their
hands and a deficit of productive occupations”. (George
P. Shultz at the Kissinger Lecture delivered on February 11,
2004, at the Library of Congress).
Demography has played a major
part in the worsening situation in the Northeast. While the
estimates of immigrants from Bangladesh
may vary from a low of 12 to 16 million to a high of 20 million
and above, the fact remains that India will always be at the
receiving end of illegal immigration from most of the countries
on India’s periphery. Much of this population has the
potential to be amenable to blandishments from anti-Indian
elements. The security implications of the increasing demographic
influx are now being perceived by New Delhi and the State of
West Bengal, which had earlier followed an ostrich-like policy
in this regard. However, neither West Bengal, nor the Northeastern
states and the Centre have formulated clear policies in this
regard to ward off the threat posed by the ever-increasing
influx from across the borders. If anything, the Centre’s
decision to maintain the status quo with relation to the IMDT
Act could exacerbate the problem in the years ahead.
Should anticipatory measures
not be taken the influx from Bangladesh – and even Pakistan and Nepal – could
become a flood when the trade pact referred to as the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing, signed by the WTO members, comes
to an end on 31 December 2004, freeing American and European
countries that currently buy from 60 countries to source them
from fewer countries. The main beneficiary will be China and
to an extent India as well, the main losers Bangladesh, Nepal
and Pakistan. Millions of people could be thrown out of work
in some of the world’s poorest and most politically volatile
countries. In Nepal, where more than 300,000 workers depend
directly or indirectly on the garment sector for their livelihood,
extending the quota system is a critical matter. Experts in
Bangladesh fear that anywhere from $1.25 billion to $2.5 billion
of that country’s annual exports could be lost, with
the shock waves rippling through the nation’s banking
sector and the entire economy. Some 70% of Bangladeshi garment
workers are women; many come from backward rural areas. It
is feared that should they lose their jobs and return home
many will have no option but to join the underground sex trade.
In this regard the decision by the House of TATA to invest
US $ 2 billion in Bangladesh would appear to be a step in the
right direction. Other Indian industrial houses could follow
suit, provided they receive cast iron guarantees from the host
government.
If not already so Bangladesh
could soon become India’s
Mexico as regards the continuing demographic influx. The USA
has not been able to stop it in spite of much better border
management programmes, including high tech surveillance. Of
course, the USA does not face the type of threat from the Mexican
influx that India potentially faces from the Bangladeshi demographic
swamping of certain areas in the Northeast and West Bengal.
The response patterns from the Indian side have to be imaginative
and innovative.
EXTERNALITIES
IMPINGING ON THE SITUATION ON INDIA’S PERIPHERY
A few excerpts that have a bearing on the discussion are tabulated
below:
- In Afghanistan, according to Christian
Aid, the U.S. has spent $40 billion on military operations,
while
the international
spending on aid is $4.5 billion.
- The world suddenlyfinds
itself confronting a new phenomenon in the international
arena. This is an actor
who in many
subtle ways has begun to influence the foreign policies
of many leading nation-states, an actorwho cannot be appeased because his objective
is total annihilation of the enemy and himself at the same time.
As Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammad put it from his home in England, "It
is foolish to fight people who want death; that is what they are looking for."
- Saudi Influence. It is a factor that has
to be taken into account because as much as Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia
is equally
to blame for the radical Islamisation of Bangladesh, as
most of the funds for setting up the anti-modern seminaries
are
sent from Saudi Arabia.
- Now Western leaders have
appropriated the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention as
part of the
military lexicon:
tough on terrorism and tough on the causes of terrorism.
Poverty and injustice are recognized as factors that nurture
terrorism.
From there the Bush administration took a major leap to
the assertion that U.S. NGOs should consider themselves a branch
of the government’s anti-terror effort. The consequences
of this approach are obvious - NGOs are associated with
U.S. military policy, and where that fails, so does the
humanitarian
effort. The NGO sector has long outgrown its charitable
beginnings and is now a global player: recent estimates
suggest that
globally some 26,000 NGOs employ 19 million people and
dispose of around
$1 trillion in finance, much of it directly from governments.
Individually, NGOs are bewilderingly diverse; collectively
they are a huge force that can change government agendas.
- But the trade-off for power on this scale
has been partnership with the governments that largely fund
them.
In areas where western governments see vital interests at
stake,
those same governments can now condition the terms under
which NGOs operate. When governments overstep the line, the
NGOs
now share the opprobrium. (The Hindu, July 15, 2004).
-
These threats to international security are not purely new
phenomena. However, what is new
in this
sense is the effect
of globalisation on these threats. Today, in a world where
things have increasingly become more trans-boundary and
interdependent, owing to the effects of globalisation, as in
the domino theory,
any incident in a country or in a region, be it a terrorist
act or an ethnic conflict, post threats on other areas.
As the corollary to this, such threats that transcend borders
happen to affect security more rapidly, more severely in
an ever-expanding magnitude with spillover effects. These
threats
inevitably necessitate collective responds as they affect
almost all states in one way or another. (Perceptions,
September–November
2003. Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War:
The Constructivist Perspective by Hasan Ulusoy).
- “The other view is that this is
a wholly new phenomenon, worldwide terrorism based on a perversion
of the
true, peaceful and honourable faith of Islam; that its roots
are in the madrasas of Pakistan, the extreme forms of the
Wahabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former training camps
of Al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan. If you take this view, the only path to take
is to confront this terrorism, remove it root and branch
and at all costs stop it acquiring the weapons to kill on
a massive
scale.” (The Statesman, 1 October 2004).
- The report of Justice Joynul
Abedin Commission, set up by prime minister Begum Khaleda
Zia to investigate
the August
21 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka, where 22 people
were killed, follows the line that she took – that
the blast was the work of a neighbouring country trying to
destabilize
her government and install a puppet regime in Bangladesh.
Short of naming India, Justice Abedin has said that the local
agents
of a neighbouring country were responsible for the blast
and mayhem. Coming on the heels of the Bangladesh foreign
minister
Morshed Khan’s provocative statement that his country
could play havoc in the northeast “as it was landlocked
by Bangladesh”, there is no doubt that the commission’s
finding will help Delhi to the conclusion that present rulers
in Dhaka are no friends of India. Whatever illusions it had
about the character of the Begum Zia government have gone
with the sudden steep rise in insurgency in the northeast.
In fact,
the recent blasts in Nagaland and Assam, which claimed over
40 lives, came soon after Morshed’s threat on the northeast.
And now that India is unjustly blamed for the 21 August carnage,
Delhi’s attitude to Dhaka is going to undergo a sea
change.
There is no doubt that the
commission’s finding is going
to result in Indo-Bangla relations touching a new low. Delhi
knows the purpose of the commission’s finding is aimed
at shielding Islamists in Jamat and also within her own party
responsible for the 21 August attack. It is also a clever move
to divert world attention from the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism,
now sweeping Bangladesh. It is also meant to muffle international
outcries against attempts on Hasina’s life. Senior world
leaders from Kofi Annan, George Bush, Putin, Blair to Manmohan
Singh have decried the attack and expressed concern over the
attempt to wipe out the entire Awami League leadership.
Some have gone to the extent
of airing their doubts about the future of democracy in Bangladesh.
That Justice Abedin’s
report has refused to identify the real identity of perpetrators
of the dastardly crime is borne out by the fact that it says
nothing about the recovery of Pakistan-made hand grenades from
the scene of attack and also from inside the high security
Dhaka central jail. Nor does it mention the bullet marks in
Hasina’s car. Actually Khaleda is trying a desperate
cover-up so that the hardcore Islamists in her party and the
Jamat, besides Mujib’s killers, who attempted a repeat
of 15 August 1975 like massacre, are never exposed and brought
to justice. She has successfully botched all investigations
into a score of bombings that have claimed over 150 lives in
the last six years. Even attackers of the British High Commissioner
in Dhaka, although identified, are not traced yet. She has
allowed Middle East based radical Islamic groups to operate
and also let them slip out of the country when exposed. Actually
Begum Zia is playing a dangerous game, much too dangerous for
her comfort. (The Statesman, 13 October 2004).
The excerpts mentioned above
provide an insight into the activities of outside powers
that influence events on India’s periphery.
For example, although USA and Saudi Arabia might not have a
direct presence in Bangladesh to the same extent as Pakistan’s
ISI, they indirectly play a role that cannot be ignored. In
the case of USA, while it has been hard on Islamic radicalism
elsewhere, it has looked on almost benignly at the activities
of the Khalida Zia government in promoting or allowing the
promotion of radical Islam in Bangladesh.
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
In the war on terror the globalised market forces now dominate
the military scene, blurring the distinction between private
and public armies as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wherever there
is a shortfall in regular soldiers, private security agencies
have been filling the gap. These private contractors have free
run of military prisons. It is quite possible that the US may
oblige or persuade Bangladesh to fill this role. It has implications
for India.
Indian defence planners have
to boldly articulate the likely outcome of the demographic
shifts being induced in the subcontinent,
almost exclusively to India’s disadvantage, be they in
Pakistan, Northern Areas, POK, Nepal or Bangladesh. Unless
a clear strategy is formulated to alter these trends Pakistan
will be strengthened immeasurably at the cost of India. Military
officers do not have to be involved with – or shy away
from the debate. The clear danger arising from the demographic
exclusion of non-Muslims from large parts of the subcontinent
and neighbouring regions, while at the same time pushing in
of people who denominationally have the potential to be hostile
to India is a direct and irrefutable military threat. It needs
to be countered urgently and decisively.
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