Talk delivered by Maj. Gen (rtd) Vinod Saighal* at   HANOI 0n 26 November   2009
                
                  “ Quand la Chine s’éveillera,   le monde tremblera"
                     The famous saying in French,   attributed to Napoleon reads: “Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera": when      China will wake up, the world will   tremble. In the decade plus since the models for   China ’s growth, reproduced below, were first   unveiled the giant strides that   China has made has evoked not only the admiration   of the world, it has caused considerable anxiety as well in   China ’s   immediate neighbourhood.  
                  Introductory Remarks
                  Toward   the end of the last century, around the turn of the millennium, this writer had   delivered two talks, which were futuristic in nature. One of them was the 
                    'Resurgence of Russia in the 21st   Century'. It was a time when   Russia was 
                    nearly on its knees   after the Yeltsin years. The national debt of   Russia was 
                    $175 billion. The scientists were leaving the country in droves; many of 
                    them were grabbed by   China . There was talk of default in   the payments due. 
                    The military was demoralized and     Chechnya was in flames. Mr. Putin had   just 
                    taken over. Oil was at 13 dollars a barrel. So when the talk on 
                    the   ‘Resurgence of Russia’ was delivered, it evoked a lot of interest about the   extent of 
                    the resurgence that could take place. The talk was repeated in a   university in the United 
                  States .
                     The second talk was on 'Dealing   with China in the 21st Century'. At the 
                    start of the talk three terms   were borrowed from astronomy and astrophysics to define 
                    the three models for   the growth of   China in the 21st century. The first 
                    model was the 'steady state expansion model'. The second was the 'dynamic 
                    expansion or the explosive expansion model'. The third was the 'implosion 
                    model'. The prognosis relating to   India was slightly off the mark when comparing   the two countries to the extent that the economic condition of      India is now much better than what 
                  had been projected at that time.       
                      Being the first presentation in the first session of the conclave it   becomes a conscious decision to concentrate on China; as the country being the   most significant regional power, its policy towards its neighbours in the   resolution of the South China Sea Dispute would set the tone for future   developments in the South China Sea as well as for  peace and prosperity in the region for   the coming decades.    
                  Models of   China 's   Pursuit for Power
                  (Excerpted from the chapter on    China from the book   “Restructuring South Asian Security”, published in   New Delhi in 2000. The   talk had been delivered several years earlier. Hence many of the formulations   have been overtaken by events not anticipated when the talk was   delivered).
                       For the purposes of this discussion three models have been taken to   examine   China 's probable development in the   new century: to whit, Steady State Expansion Model; Explosive Expansion Model;   and Implosion Model. Diagrammatically these are represented in the following   manner:
                  
                                                         
                        An explanation for each of the models is given below. 
                  Figure – 1: Steady State Expansion   Model
                        According to this model - denoted by concentric circles -   China   expands its influence in the next century in ever expanding circles. Going   outwards from the core, the first circle denotes the spread of Chinese influence to regions contiguous to    China i.e. the Asia-Pacific   region, North and South   Korea ,   Taiwan ,   Japan , the Islands under dispute (notably    Spratley   Islands ),   Mongolia ,   Russia , South East Asia, South Asia and    West Asia . The second circle denotes the spread   of China 's geo-political power to the whole of Asia and      Australia . The outer and last circle   represents the spread of Chinese geo-political influence to include the whole world   minus North and South America .
                         The words ‘influence’ and ‘power’ have been put in parenthesis. The   difference between the two needs to be understood in the context in which they   are used here. Influence means that   China 's sensibilities would weigh heavily in any   major foreign policy decision taken by its neighbours in Asia; whereas power   implies that China would have   developed the military capability to project that power in the region regardless   of any intimidation on that score by   USA .   Russia would, in   all probability, remain outside the ambit of such projections because of its   retaliatory nuclear might. 
                  India may not be able to challenge    China , even in South Asia, if      India 's military disparity with its   bigger neighbour in the conventional as well as the nuclear field remains vastly   inferior, as at present. The tragic part, however, is that the military   disparity, if not checked, will continue to grow to a level where      India becomes marginalised in its own   region as well. In the years ahead   China 's military might would be in a position to   challenge that of the USA ,   while Indian defence planners will continue to defend their inadequacy by   maintaining - as they have been doing religiously since the 1970s - that      China remains ten years away from   becoming a real military threat to this country. 
                   Figure-2: Dynamic Expansion (Explosion)   Model
                  This   model depicts uncontrolled or runaway growth as distinct from the steady state   expansion depicted in the previous model. It could in some ways be compared to   what happened in   Indonesia . The point at which the   country explodes, in the Indonesian fashion, would be difficult to determine. It   could happen in twenty years or after fifty years. There are several factors,   which could propel the country in the direction indicated in the model. Some of   the factors are tabulated below:
                     The extent of consolidation of power by Jiang Zemin; and his   longevity. 
                  Flowing from the first point the smoothness, or otherwise, of the   succession to President Jiang Zemin when he leaves the world stage. It would be   worth recalling here that had Deng Xiaoping not succeeded the great leader Mao   and the so-called Gang of Four gained ascendancy in the post-Mao struggle the   history of China, and just possibly the world, would have been different. It   would also not be out of place to recall here the manner of fall of Mikhail   Gorbatchev and the break up of   USSR .
                  American attempts to force the pace of change of modernization and   democratization in   China ; a pace that prevents the   Chinese leaders from being able to control the fallout from such rapid change.   It would arguably be the quest of American geo-political strategy to engineer   the breakup of China (and      India as well) so that no credible   challenge would remain to American dominance of the globe in the 21st Century,   and beyond. And should   America succeed in its endeavour then   the turn of the European Union would assuredly come thereafter. 
                  The great economic disparity that already exists between    China 's provinces on the   South Western coast (and now Hong Kong) and remainder   China , notably   the interior regions.
                  Incomes disparities and growing unemployment due to the rapid   changes in economic policy.   
                  The emergence of 'sleaze' as an increasingly effective weapon of   war - both internally and externally.    (Grand reversal of economic warfare patterns by   China .    China now uses this weapon   subtly, and not so subtly, to influence economic policies towards    China in the West, especially      USA .  
                  Figure – 3: Implosion   Model
                  The   Implosion Model differs from the earlier model in Fig.2 in that under this model      China collapses under the weight of   its own size. Such a collapse, in the case of   China , would be   built up from growing internal unrest as well as pressure from outside tending   to compress the nation from all directions. At this juncture, it is difficult to   visualize such compression - the other term for it being containment - taking   place with the collapse of the old   USSR and the relative military insignificance of      India . Additionally,      China has reached a stage of military   and economic growth that allows it to be capable of resisting American pressure.   (Ambivalent attitude of Hong Kong 's population   should be kept in mind. Only surface integration of distinctly pro-Chinese   elements has taken place. It is not inconceivable that in the run up to the   handing back of the Crown Colony the British would have created a strong   anti-Chinese bureaucracy that would resist change after the departure of the   colonial power i.e. the pattern perfected on the subcontinent).
                  China as   the Region’s Colossus
                  The Nature of Colossi. After slumber and   subjugation of several centuries   China is again becoming the great   country that it was throughout most of its history. It already looms large on   the horizon of its Asian neighbours. In the coming decades it will assume the   shape of a colossus, especially if it pursues the Dynamic Expansion Model as it   seems to be doing by present indications. When that happens it will begin to   exhibit the 'nature' of a colossus. What exactly is the nature of a colossus?   The nature of a colossus is that it begins to develop an appetite for   aggrandizement. By making this statement it is not the intention here to attribute any   malign intent to   China 's leadership. The discussion is   on historical phenomenon. They closely resemble natural phenomenon. Throughout   history its colossi have, almost without exception, manifested this urge.   Kingdoms that became large grew into empires. Empires, after consolidation,   started becoming larger and larger through a process of conquest till they   assumed gigantic proportions i.e. they had become fit enough to burst. The   nineteenth and twentieth centuries were no exception. The   British Empire grew so large that ultimately it had to   give way. The Soviet Empire is a more recent case from our century. The lone   superpower is already showing strains; the bursting point may not be that far   off unless the   USA takes stock of where it is headed   and follows up with urgent – and drastic - remedial measures. This time around,   the difference would be that when the explosion occurs it could possibly destroy   much of the world as well. It is the reality of nuclear weapons and weapons of   mass destruction. 
                   China no doubt   is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto rights. In the second   half of the 20th Century when the country was in the process of   growing to its natural size it needed the veto right to protect its vital   interests against the two superpowers of that time as it could have been   thwarted by either of them in its quest for occupying its rightful place in the   world. This is no longer the case. One of the erstwhile superpowers is now   itself in a vulnerable state. The remaining superpower is no longer in a   position to dictate terms to   China .   China   has come a long way, a very long way indeed. It is an unquestioned global power   at the close of the opening decade of the new century. 
                  After   this brief recapitulation of facts that would generally be 
                    well known, a   simple question is addressed: "As a world power is China going to 
                  play a   benign role or will it flex its muscles as it goes along"? It could take the   latter course going by its past history. Why should that be the case?
                  Several   millennia ago Chanakya in his Arthashastra had written: "It is the 
  nature of power to assert itself". The   United States of   America has been the 
                    world power for less   than half a century; the degree of assertion that it is 
                    exercising on the   globe is self-evident.   China has been a great power for   thousands of 
                    years. There is hardly any parallel to it in the entire world.   The assertion 
                  of power comes to it naturally. It is almost programmed into   its psyche.
                  Military Asymmetry
                   China's expanding military capabilities would   automatically be a matter of growing concern to its neighbours in   Asia , if not the world in general. A few unmistakable   indicators are tabulated below:
                     China's military expenditure is growing at over ten   percent per year as per some Western estimates.
                     China's official defence budget excludes nuclear   weapons development, R&D and soldiers pensions. Nor does it include sale   proceeds from armaments. These other expenditures were estimated at five billion   dollars between 1991 and 1995. They would have increased substantially since   then.
                     China's rapid reaction force which stood at fifteen   thousand in 1988 has since expanded to more than two hundred   thousand.
                     The naval expansion   under way is fairly awesome from a regional and Asian   standpoint.
                     The acquisition of   SU-27s and other aerial platforms has been well documented and is not being   listed. 
                  In addition to what has been tabulated above   note has to be taken of the aspects enumerated below:
                  Without any   conceivable threat to its territory - now, or in the foreseeable future,      China 's military expenditure is   increasing exponentially. It goes beyond the needs of a military operation   across its borders by another country or for any confrontation with its southern   neighbours - individually, or collectively.
                  China will soon project power by its sheer size well   beyond the Continent of Asia. (   USA ,   Russia , the European Union, the    Koreas ,   Japan , South East Asia, West Asia and even      Australia are learning to take into   account Chinese sensibilities in their foreign policy projections). 
                  The Chinese often go   to great lengths to underplay their capabilities. They keep saying at every   opportunity, "we will never seek hegemony". This has to be seen in the light of   Sun Tzu's famous saying "never let out your real intentions. Lull your   adversaries by all possible means. Hide your capabilities".  
                  China was not powerful militarily in the 1970s. Yet,   it did not hesitate to launch a massive invasion of its (then) fraternal comrade      Vietnam . "Just to teach it a lesson",   it was said in some circles.   
                  Seizure of "Mischief   Reef" from a friendly South East Asian country in 1995 has given it a forward   perch in that region.
                  Myanmar and a few other countries are firmly under   Chinese influence. China has   exploitation rights over sixty percent of   Kazakhstan 's oil reserves, edging out   US oil   companies, Amoco and Texaco.
                  China has made known its intent to commit a sizeable   naval presence in the Indian Ocean . It is   constructing ports capable of berthing Chinese submarines and warships in   several South Asian countries.
                  The   tabulation above is hardly exhaustive. It is nevertheless fairly indicative of   the direction in which   China is headed. The military build   up has started causing concern to countries at one remove from the South China   Sea (SCS), namely Australia   and   India among others. The anxiety that   the build up could cause to its immediate neighbours in the SCS would be far   greater. 
                  A   fair portion of the geopolitical   space in the 21st century could be occupied by   India and   China . Their   relations are characterized by alternating dialectics of rivalry and   cooperation, the current status resting largely on the pace of their economic   growth. The rapidly expanding economies of   China and   India could   sustain world demand well into the future. An arms race between these two Asian   neighbours as well as the increase in armaments that might be forced on its SCS   neighbours owing to the alarming asymmetry would be devastating in the long-term   for the stability of the region and Asia, if not the world. Therefore, the onus   is fairly on China as the strongest Asian power to cut back on its massive   militarization programme to reassure its immediate neighbours, in the first   instance; because should the asymmetry remain, the imbalance would hardly be   conducive to a status quo that might be the first step to settling the SCS   disputes. 
                  The Environmental   Imperative
                  "The dangers that we face from   eco-destruction dwarf the mere problems of national security". The statement   was made long ago by someone who is an unknown quantity outside      India . Since then global warming,   extinction of species, depletion of fisheries stocks, melting of polar ice caps   and the receding of glaciers in Tibet, the roof of the world, leave no scope for   doubting that the world of tomorrow might not bear very much resemblance to that   of today, especially in the coastal regions and archipelagoes around the world.   Well before 2050, perhaps by 2020, the futility of military structures and naval   presence on the Paracels and the Spratleys might come home to all the   disputants. 
                  Since   there would hardly be any disagreement among the SCS countries that global   warming and ecological decline around the world might become greater threats to   survival than minor territorial disputes between neighbours it would be in the   fitness of things to take urgent measures to resolve the SCS dispute at the   earliest, before the madness of militarizing barren pieces of rock goes any   further.
                  Resolution Modes
                     
                  Elementary first steps that might help in the resolution of the   contentious SCS issues are listed below:
                  Declaration of the Paracel and Spratley group of islands in the    South China Sea as a marine ecology park;
                     Pledge to halt further occupation, construction activity,   militarization or stationing of naval ships in the Spratleys as well as the   Paracels;
                     Gradual dismantling of existing military structures by a given   date (say 31 December 2012) and further declaration of the SCS as a Zone of   Peace.
                     A common approach to exploitation of natural resources in the   areas under dispute. A Resource Exploitation Commission of countries contiguous   to the disputed islands should be empowered to undertake exploitation on behalf   of all parties and proceeds to be shared on a pro rata or any other basis   decided by the Commission and ratified by the concerned countries;
                     All further exploitation to cease till the Commission has   completed its work and obtained ratification.  
                  Concluding Remarks
                  In   the closing decade of the last century many analysts had started writing about   the shift away of the center of gravity from Europe to   Asia . It did not take long for the change to take place.   Today, nobody doubts that Asia is the economic   giant of the world. This situation is likely to continue for the best part of   the 21st century, if not beyond. Moreover,   Asia is also the playground – more appropriately,   battleground – for the geopolitical sweepstakes of the coming decades.    Japan and the Tiger economies   were the forerunners of wealth creation in   Asia . The emphasis here is on wealth creation through   industrialization, globalization and market competition. Wealth has also been   created in some parts of the Middle East and now Central   Asia due to the hydrocarbon reserves located in those countries.   Whether these run out in a few years, or a few decades, or last longer than   presently anticipated, is a question of considerable debate. What is not being   debated, however, is the near-certain rise of   China and   India as the new   economic giants of the century.     In concert with the two biggest countries, ASEAN,   Japan , South   Korea ,   Taiwan and hopefully at some stage    North Korea as well can   become the harbingers of the decades or even the century of prosperity for the   enlarged East Asia region. A beginning toward   this end can be made with the settlement of the South China   Sea disputes.   
                  In the end it remains for the speaker   to thank the Vietnamese hosts for planning and holding such an ambitious   conclave.
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                  *Major   General Vinod Saighal retired from the Indian Army in 1995 from the post of   Director General Military Training. Before that he had several active command   assignments, including the command of an independent armoured formation and   mountain and desert divisions. An officer from the cavalry he has held   assignments with UN peacekeeping forces as well as tenures in the   Middle East . He had served as the country's Military   Attache in France and    BENELUX . He has a wide range of interests and   speaks several languages including French and Persian. Currently he is the   Executive Director of Eco Monitors Society (EMS), a non-governmental   organization concerned with demography and ecology. After retirement, he founded   the Movement for Restoration of Good Government (MRGG). He has published   articles on a vast range of subjects in some of the leading national dailies and   periodicals. He has lectured extensively in   India and abroad   on several burning issues of the day. Vinod Saighal was invited to join the   'Institutional Advisory Board' of USFSS (US Federation of Scientists and   Scholars) in 2000. He is the author of the internationally acclaimed book   'Third Millennium Equipoise'. Additionally, he has authored Restructuring South Asian Security, Restructuring Pakistan and Dealing with Global Terrorism: The Way Forward. His latest book is Global Security Paradoxes – 2000-2020.